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EXECUTING LARGE ORDERS IN A MICROSCOPIC MARKET
MODEL
ALEXANDER WEISS
Abstract. In a recent paper, Alfonsi, Fruth and Schied (AFS) propose a
simple order book based model for the impact of large orders on stock prices.
They use this model to derive optimal strategies for the execution of large
orders. We apply these strategies to an agent-based stochastic order book
model that was recently proposed by Bovier, Cˇerny´ and Hryniv, but already
the calibration fails. In particular, from our simulations the recovery speed of
the market after a large order is clearly dependent on the order size, whereas
the AFS model assumes a constant speed. For this reason, we propose a
generalization of the AFS model, the GAFS model, that incorporates this
dependency, and prove the optimal investment strategies. As a corollary, we
find that we can derive the “correct” constant resilience speed for the AFS
model from the GAFS model such that the optimal strategies of the AFS and
the GAFS model coincide. Finally, we show that the costs of applying the
optimal strategies of the GAFS model to the artificial market environment
still differ significantly from the model predictions, indicating that even the
improved model does not capture all of the relevant details of a real market.
1. Introduction
For a long time, financial mathematics mainly focused on asset pricing, but the
scope has been extended in the last years. One of the current topics of interest is
the theory of optimal trading strategies for the execution of large orders. Here, a
trader would like to purchase1 a huge volume of shares up to time T . Since the
supply of limit orders for a certain price is limited, the trader will not be able to
trade the whole order for the current price, but he or she will suffer from an adverse
price movement. This additional price impact, induced by the trader’s own trading,
can be lessened if he or she gives the market time to recover; the best price returns
to previous levels. However, the time interval [0, T ] is assumed to be too short in
order to wait for a full recovery of the market. The optimal execution problem asks
for the optimal splitting and the optimal trading times to minimize the expected
price impact.
There have been several models to solve the optimal execution problem, moti-
vated by empirical findings (for references see next paragraph); yet, since we do
not know if these models capture all relevant features of real markets, we cannot
be sure that the strategies work in reality, and tests on real markets would be an
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expensive experiment. For this reason, microscopic market models are an excellent
tool for testing theoretical models of optimal trading strategies. Based on assump-
tions about the market participants’ behavior, these models simulate the trading
of financial assets on the level of single traders or orders [GB03, SFGK03, BCˇH06].
The emerging price processes show typical features of real markets [Con01, PB03,
ATHL05]. Hence, microscopic models provide artificial, yet reasonable, market en-
vironments that allow for applying optimal trading strategies without costs or risk,
comparing the numerical results with the theoretical expectations and resolving de-
viations by an improvement of the underlying market assumptions with respect to
the empirical findings. In this paper, we exemplify how this approach can improve
a solution for the optimal execution problem.
All approaches to the optimal execution problem rely on two empirical findings
that have been validated in many studies (see [Sch08], pp. 3, for a list of references):
First, a large order has an impact on its price; second, this impact decreases in time,
but it does not vanish completely. That implies the costs of all subsequent orders
are influenced by the impact of a large order. These two effects are called tempo-
rary and permanent impact. Many models implement these observations straightly
[BL98, AC01, HS05]: They consider a stochastic process that simulates the current
best price evolving independently from the large trader’s action in time, and two
functions mapping the volume of a large order to the temporary or, respectively,
permanent impact. When a large order is executed, the corresponding impacts are
just added to the price. Yet, it is doubtful if the complex dynamics of limit order
books (LOB), which underlie most modern markets, can be captured by looking at
the best price only. Therefore, recent models attempt to take the dynamics of the
whole order book into account. Obizhaeva and Wang introduced a model with an
underlying block shaped LOB and calculated the optimal trading strategy in terms
of a recursive formula by applying Bellman equations [OW05]. Alfonsi, Fruth and
Schied introduced a generalization of this model for general order book shapes and
gave an explicit solution for the optimal trading strategy with respect to their mar-
ket model (introduced in [AFS09] and revisited in [AS09]); this model is the one
we will test in a microscopic market environment, and we refer to it as the AFS
model.
The AFS model describes the underlying market by two parameters: The shape
of the (continuous) LOB given by a shape function f and a positive constant ρ
expressing the resilience speed of the order book. There are two versions of the
model: In the first one, the consumed volume recovers exponentially fast; in the
second version, the best price recovers in this way. The shape of the order book is
static such that there is a bijection between the impact on the best price and on
the volume. Thus, the response of the order book to the execution of a large order
depends on the current price impact only, but not on possible executions before.
To test the optimal AFS strategies, we need to select a microscopic market
model. The model that serves best as virtual market environment was introduced
by Bovier, Cˇerny and Hryniv and is called the Opinion Game [BCˇH06]. It simulates
a family of traders on the level of a generalized order book. The underlying idea of
the generalized order book is that every trader has an individual, subjective opinion
about the current fair price. Instead of orders, the generalized order book records
these opinions. Thus, it also captures traders who are willing to trade for a price
close to the best quotes but have not placed public orders (in some markets it is also
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possible to place hidden or partially visible orders [FS09, BPV09]). These traders
offer hidden liquidity; they will influence the price impact when an order is executed
but do not appear in the order book [WR05]. Thus, the Opinion Game provides a
more realistic market response to orders than classical order book models.
In order to apply the AFS strategies in the Opinion Game, we have to determine
the correct values for f and ρ. There are several problems to find the value for ρ.
First, the AFS model does not assume a permanent impact; second, the market
recovery is only poorly approximated by an exponential function; third, ρ does not
exist as a constant value but depends on the traded volume. While the first two
items can be bypassed, the third item strongly conflicts with the assumptions of the
AFS model. For this reason we introduce a generalization of the AFS model that
we call the generalized AFS model or GAFS model. The GAFS model substitutes
ρ by ρ¯ that is a function of an order’s price impact or volume impact, depending
on the model version. Furthermore, we extend the results of the AFS model by
proving that there exists a unique, deterministic optimal trading strategy for the
GAFS model. It turns out that, although ρ¯ is a function, the optimal strategy
evaluates it for one value only. Consequently, the optimal strategies of the AFS
and the GAFS models coincide when ρ is chosen to be this value. In this sense, the
AFS model is also sufficient for the order impact dependent case, but the GAFS
model is needed to calibrate it correctly.
After calibrating the (G)AFS model to the Opinion Game, we calculate the op-
timal strategies for several parameter sets, apply these strategies to the Opinion
Game, and sample their impact costs. On a general level, the sampled costs show
the expected natural behavior; for instance, the costs decrease if the available trad-
ing time T or the number of trading opportunities within [0, T ] become larger.
Furthermore, the simulations reinforce the advantages of the GAFS model com-
pared to the AFS model. We show that the AFS model performs worse than the
GAFS model for a bad, yet reasonable, choice of the value for ρ. On the other hand,
we find that, in comparison to the predicted costs, the sampled costs of the GAFS
strategies are up to four times higher. This shows that the (G)AFS model does not
capture all relevant details of the Opinion Game’s order book dynamics, indicating
that the optimal (G)AFS strategies could also perform worse than theoretically
expected on real markets.
In Section 2, we introduce the AFS model and restate its optimal trading strate-
gies. In Section 3, we present this version of the Opinion Game that we used to
analyze the AFS model. In Section 4, we determine f and ρ in the Opinion Game,
which leads to the GAFS model. Finally, in Section 5, we apply the GAFS optimal
strategies in the Opinion Game, and compare the resulting costs for several param-
eter sets. Furthermore, we show that the GAFS strategies perform better than the
AFS strategies with an suboptimal choice of ρ in the Opinion Game.
2. The market model of Alfonsi, Fruth and Schied and its optimal
execution strategies
A trader would like to purchase X0 > 0 shares within a time period [0, T ], T > 0.
X0 is assumed to be large such that the trader’s order has an impact on the price
and the underlying limit order book. We will refer to this trader as large trader
in the following. Because we consider a buy order, we first define how the upper
part of the LOB, which contains the sell limit orders, is modeled. As long as the
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Figure 1. The order book of the AFS model. For simplicity, we
have left off the time index t.
large trader does not take action, the LOB is described by the unaffected best ask
price A0 := (A0t )t≥0 and by a shape function f : R → (0,∞) (see Figure 1). A
0
is a martingale on a given filtered probability space (Ω, (Ft)t≥0,F , P ) satisfying
A00 = A0 for some A0 ∈ R; f is a continuous function. The amount of shares
available for a price A0t + x, x ≥ 0, at time t is then given by f(x)dx. Notice that
the shape of the order book with respect to the best ask price is static.
Now, assume the large trader acts for the first time and purchases x0 shares at
time t0; he or she consumes all shares between A
0
t0
and A0t0 + D
A
t0+, D
A
t0+ being
uniquely determined by
(2.1)
∫ DAt0+
0
f(x)dx = x0.
DA := (DA)t≥0 is called the extra spread caused by the large trader. In general, if
we know DAtn for a trading time tn, D
A
tn+ is given by
(2.2)
∫ DAtn+
DAtn
f(x)dx = xn
whereby xn is the amount of shares traded at time tn. The large trader is inactive
between two trading times, tn and tn+1, and the extra spread recovers. For the
exact way of recovery there are two versions considered. To conform to the notation
of [AFS09], we first state Version 2. In this case, DAt is defined for t ∈ (tn, tn+1] by
(2.3) DAt := e
−ρ(t−tn)DAtn+.
The parameter ρ is a positive constant called the resilience speed. To complete the
definition, we set DAt := 0 for t ≤ t0. Now, we can introduce the best ask price
A := (At)t≥0 by
(2.4) At := A
0
t +D
A
t .
In contrast to A0, A includes the large trader’s impact. In particular, the amount
of shares available for a price A0t + x at time t is given by
(2.5)
{
f(x)dx for x ≥ At −A
0
t
0 otherwise
.
In other words, every trader in the market experiences the large trader’s impact
after time t0.
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The price impact DA can also be expressed in terms of the impact on the volume
EA := (EAt )t≥0. Because the shape function f is strictly positive, there is a one-
to-one relation between EA and DA. Given DA, the process EA is defined by
(2.6) EAt :=
∫ DAt
0
f(x)dx.
We can generally introduce the antiderivative of f ,
(2.7) F (x) :=
∫ x
0
f(x)dx,
to get the relations
(2.8) EAt = F (D
A
t ) and D
A
t = F
−1(EAt ).
By (2.2) and (2.8), we easily conclude
(2.9) EAtn+ = E
A
tn
+ xn.
This motivates to define Version 1, in which we first define EA and then derive DA
by relation (2.8). We set EAt := 0 for t ∈ [0, t0] and
(2.10) EAt := e
−ρ(t−tn)EAtn+, t ∈ (tn, tn+1].
The equations (2.9) and (2.10) define EA completely.
Summarizing, we have introduced two versions of the AFS model: In Version
1, we define the volume impact EA and assume that it recovers exponentially fast
between the large trader’s orders. DA is then derived from EA by relation (2.8); in
Version 2, we first define the price impactDA, assume an exponentially fast recovery
and derive EA from it. Observe that the AFS model recovers completely as the time
tends to infinity (and if no more large orders are executed after some finite time);
there is no permanent impact. Furthermore, the assumption of an exponential decay
of the price impact is under discussion in the scientific community. An empirical
study in [BGPW04] suggests a power-law decay. On a theoretic level, Gatheral
proved for a market model similar to the AFS model that an exponential decay
can easily imply arbitrage opportunities while power-law decays do not show this
undesired property [Gat09]. Alfonsi and Schied, however, were able to show in
[AS09] that, despite of the similarity to Gatheral’s model, the AFS model does not
give arbitrage opportunities (under mild assumptions concerning the shape of the
order book). The final answer to the question how the decay of the price impact
is modeled best has not been given yet. As far as we know, the same question for
the volume impact has not been treated.
We cannot exclude a priori that it is reasonable to sell shares and to buy them
back later. Thus, we also have to model the impact of (large) sell orders on the
LOB. Such orders will be written as orders with negative sign. Let B0 = (B0t )t≥0
be the unaffected best bid price with
(2.11) B0t ≤ A
0
t for all t ≥ 0
as only constraint for its dynamics. The lower part of the LOB is modeled by the
shape function f on the negative part of its domain. More precisely, the number
of bids for the price B0t + x, x < 0, is given by f(x)dx. As before, we can now
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introduce the extra spread DB := (DBt )t≥0. Given a sell order xn < 0, a trading
time tn, and D
B
tn
, DBtn+ is implicitly defined by
(2.12)
∫ DBtn+
DBtn
f(x)dx = xn.
Note that DB is non-positive. We equivalently define the impact on the volume
EB := (EBt )t≥0 by
(2.13) EBtn+ := E
B
tn
+ xn.
EB is also non-positive, and its connection to DB is again given by (2.8). To
complete the definitions for sell orders, we set DBt := 0 and E
B
t := 0 for all t ≤ t0,
and
(2.14)


EBt := e
−ρ(t−tn)EBtn+ for Version 1
DBt := e
−ρ(t−tn)DBtn+ for Version 2
for t ∈ (tn, tn+1],
whereby tn and tn+1 are two successive trading times of the large trader.
Now that all orders are well defined, we introduce the cost of a large order xtn
at some trading time tn by
(2.15)
πtn(xtn) :=


∫DAtn+
DAtn
(A0tn + x)f(x)dx for a buy market order xtn ≥ 0
∫DBtn+
DBtn
(B0tn + x)f(x)dx for a sell market order xtn < 0
.
We assume that the large trader needs to purchase the X0 shares in N +1 steps
at equidistant points in time 0 =: t0 < · · · < tN := T . His or her admissible
strategies are sequences ξ = (ξ0, . . . , ξN ) of random variables such that
•
∑N
n=0 ξn = X0,
• ξn is Ftn -measurable for all n, and
• all ξn are bounded from below.
We denote the set of all admissible strategies by Ξˆ. The goal is to find an admissible
strategy ξ∗ that minimizes the average cost C (ξ) given by the sum of the single
trades’ costs:
(2.16) C (ξ) := E
(
N∑
n=0
πtn(ξn)
)
.
Under the technical assumption that
(2.17) lim
x→∞
F (X) =∞ and lim
x→−∞
F (x) = −∞,
Alfonsi, Fruth and Schied give the unique optimal strategies for both versions ex-
plicitly. We restate them here to give the reader the opportunity to compare them
to our theorems for the GAFS model in Section 4. For the sake of convenience, we
set τ := T/(N + 1) = tn+1 − tn.
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Optimal strategy for Version 1, Theorem 4.1 in [AFS09]. Suppose that the function
(2.18) h1(x) := F
−1(x) − e−ρτF−1(e−ρτx)
is one-to-one. Then there exists a unique optimal strategy ξ(1) = (ξ
(1)
0 , . . . , ξ
(1)
N ).
The initial market order ξ
(1)
0 is the unique solution of the equation
(2.19) F−1
(
X0 −Nξ
(1)
0 (1− e
−ρτ )
)
=
h1(ξ
(1)
0 )
1− eρτ
,
the intermediate orders are given by
(2.20) ξ
(1)
1 = · · · = ξ
(1)
N−1 = ξ
(1)
0 (1 − e
−ρτ ),
and the final order is determined by
(2.21) ξ
(1)
N = X0 −
N−1∑
n=0
ξ(1)n .
In particular, the optimal strategy is deterministic. Moreover, it consists only of
nontrivial buy orders, that is ξn > 0 for all n.
Optimal strategy for Version 2, Theorem 5.1 in [AFS09]. Suppose that the function
(2.22) h2(x) := x
f(x) − e−2ρτf(e−ρτx)
f(x)− e−ρτf(e−ρτx)
is one-to-one and that the shape function satisfies
(2.23) lim
|x|→∞
x2 inf
y∈[e−ρτx,x]
f(y) =∞.
Then there exists a unique optimal strategy ξ(2) = (ξ
(2)
0 , . . . , ξ
(2)
N ). The initial
market order ξ
(2)
0 is the unique solution of the equation
(2.24) F−1
(
X0 −N [ξ
(2)
0 − F (e
−ρτF−1(ξ
(2)
0 ))]
)
= h(F−1(ξ
(2)
0 )),
the intermediate orders are given by
(2.25) ξ
(2)
1 = · · · = ξ
(2)
N−1 = ξ
(2)
0 − F (e
−ρτF−1(ξ
(2)
0 )),
and the final order is determined by
(2.26) ξ
(2)
N = X0 −
N−1∑
n=0
ξ(2)n .
In particular, the optimal strategy is deterministic. Moreover, it consists only of
nontrivial buy orders, that is ξn > 0 for all n.
One can easily check that the orders ξ
(·)
1 , . . . , ξ
(·)
N−1 have exactly the volume that
has recovered since the last trade. In this sense, the theorems just give the right
balance between the first and the last order. This balance is found by solving the
particular equations, (2.19) and (2.24), given in both theorems.
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3. The Opinion Game
Next, we focus on the Opinion Game. In Section 3.1, we recapitulate the original
model as introduced by Bovier, Cˇerny´ and Hryniv in [BCˇH06]. We have already
discussed in the introduction why the underlying generalized order book of this
model provides even more information about the market behavior than a classical
order book. Yet, the Opinion Game has no explicit notion of orders and, conse-
quently, also large orders and their executions are not defined. However, we argue
in Section 3.2 that the generalized order book contains an implicit notion of or-
ders. Furthermore, we state the algorithm that we use to simulate the execution of
large orders and show on a qualitative level that this extension leads to a realistic
response of the Opinion Game to large orders.
3.1. The model. We consider a fixed number of tradersN ∈ N and a fixed number
of tradable sharesM < N . Every trader is described by the pair (pi, ni), whereby pi
is the opinion of trader i about the right logarithmic price; the opinion is individual
and subjective. For numerical reasons, pi ∈ Z. The number of shares that trader i
posseses is given by ni. In the most general setting, ni can take values form 0 to
M ; however, we just divide traders in buyers and sellers by setting ni ∈ {0, 1}. We
define the best bid price by
(3.1) pb := max
i:ni=0
pi,
and the best ask price by
(3.2) pa := min
i:ni=1
pi;
the price p is given by
(3.3) p :=
pb + pa
2
.
The market is said to be in a stable state if pb < pa; no buyer is then willing to pay
the lowest asked price and vice versa.
For numerical reasons, the dynamics is defined in discrete time. Every round
consists of three steps:
(1) A trader is chosen
We define
(3.4) g(i, t) :=
{
(1 + pb(t)− pi(t))
−γ if trader i is buyer
(1 + pi(t)− p
a(t))−γ if trader i is seller
,
and set
(3.5) P (trader i is chosen at time t) :=
g(i, t)∑N
j=1 g(j, t)
.
The parameter γ > 0 can be chosen arbitrarily. Observe that the defined
measure prefers traders close to the price. The larger γ is the greater is this
preference. Here, we assume that a trader close to the current price reacts
faster to price fluctuations than a long time investor with an opinion being
completely different from the current price.
(2) The trader’s change of opinion
If a trader is chosen, he or she changes her opinion to p′i(t+1) := pi(t)+d(t).
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The random variable d(t) takes values in {−l,−l + 1, . . . , l − 1, l}, l ∈ N,
and is independently sampled for all t. The measure of d(t) is given by
(3.6) P (d(t) = m) =


1
2l+1 ((µext(t)µ·)
m ∧ 1) for m 6= 0
1−
∑l
m=1 P (d(t) = ±m) else
, whereby
(3.7) µ· :=
{
µB if trader i is a buyer
µS if trader i is a seller
.
We assume that µS < 1 < µB to implement the idea that all traders have a
tendency to move into the direction of the price. The µext(t) introduces a
drift that changes randomly in time and acts on all traders in the same way,
modeling news, rumors and events influencing the price. This drift process
is of paramount importance for the stylized facts, statistical features of the
price process on large time scales; however, as we want to concentrate on
the large orders’ impact, which happens on shorter time scales, we assume
µext ≡ 1 in the remainder of this article.
(3) Trading (if necessary)
If the market with the changed opinion is stable again, that is
(3.8) pb((p1(t), . . . , p
′
i(t), . . . , pN (t))) < p
a((p1(t), . . . , p
′
i(t), . . . , pN (t))),
we set pi(t+1) := p
′
i(t+1), else a trade happens. Let us assume that trader
i is a buyer, the other case is symmetric. We uniformly choose a trading
partner j with pj(t) = p
a(t) and set ni(t+ 1) = 0 and nj(t+ 1) = 1. After
the trade, both traders move away from the best price:
(3.9) pi(t+ 1) := p
a(t+ 1) + g¯ and pj(t+ 1) := p
a(t+ 1)− g
whereby g¯ and g can be fixed or random numbers in N. This last step
is justified by the idea that the traders want to make profit and are only
willing to trade for a better price than they have paid.
3.2. An extension for large orders. For the existence of orders in the Opinion
Game, let us consider a buyer and a seller with matching opinions such that a
trade happens. In order book driven markets, trades can only come about if both
traders have placed some kind of orders. From this point of view, the Opinion
Game has an implicit notion of orders, at least when trades are happening. This
observation motivates a change of our point of view on the Opinion Game: In the
remainder of this article, we rather think about (maybe hidden or unplaced) buy
or sell orders instead of traders with opinion. For the sake of convenience, we omit
the word generalized in the following when we talk about the order book of the
Opinion Game.
To test the AFS model, we have to introduce large orders to the Opinion Game.
Assume we would like to purchase X stocks at time t. Then, we do not apply the
standard dynamics explained above at time t; instead, we use the following algo-
rithm:
set p
(1)
k := pk(t) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , N}
set n
(1)
k := nk(t) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , N}
let pa(1) be the best ask price of the configuration
(
p
(1)
k , n
(1)
k
)
k∈{1,...,N}
10 ALEXANDER WEISS
from x := 1 to X do {
find i s.th. p
(x)
i ≤ p
(x)
j for all j ∈ {1, . . . , N}
p
(x+1)
i := p
a(x)
choose uniformly trading partner j s.th. i 6= j and p
(x)
j = p
a(x)
n
(x+1)
i := 1 and n
(x+1)
j := 0
p
(x+1)
j := p
a(x)− g
p
(x+1)
i := p
a(x) + gˆ(x)
set p
(x+1)
k := p
(x+1)
k for all k ∈ {1, . . . , N}\{i, j}
set n
(x+1)
k := n
(x+1)
k for all k ∈ {1, . . . , N}\{i, j}
let pa(x+1) be the best ask price of the configuration
(
p
(x+1)
i , n
(x+1)
i
)
i∈{1,...,N}
}
set pk(t+ 1) := p
(X+1)
k for all k ∈ {1, . . . , N}\{i, j}
set nk(t+ 1) := n
(X+1)
k for all k ∈ {1, . . . , N}\{i, j}
The value g is the same random or deterministic value as in the original dynamics.
The random variables gˆ(x) are independently distributed with measure
(3.10) P (gˆ(x) = k) =
1
M
N∑
n=1
1
{p
(x)
n −pa(x)=k}
for k ∈ N0.
In other words, we execute a large buy order of volume X by taking the lowest
X orders one by one and putting them directly to the ask price such that a trade
is enforced. The number of market participants is constant in the Opinion Game,
thus taking orders from the tail is an obvious method to simulate a large order that
is placed out of the blue. After each single trade, we adjust the order prices; the
price of the (new) buy order is decreased by g, the price of the sell order is increased
by gˆ. The density function of gˆ is given by the order book’s current shape.
This choice of gˆ leads to a realistic response of the order book to the execution
of large orders (see Figure 2). While the large order is executed, the new sell orders
have a great probability to be placed in vicinity to the peak of the order book’s
seller part; thus the peak grows, and the order book provides more liquidity for
prices in this region. Here, we implement the idea that the execution of a large buy
order leads to a conspicuous rise in the price that attracts more traders to place sell
orders close to the current best ask price; these traders hope that the price increase
continues such that their orders are executed. At the same time, these additional
offers provide more liquidity that slows down the price increase. If we consider
the immediate price impact of the large order as function of the executed volume,
the additional liquidity leads to a sublinear function shape. Sublinear behavior of
an order’s immediate price impact has also been observed for real world markets
in several empirical studies [BGPW04, ATHL05]. After the execution of the large
order, the price increase stops and some traders realize quickly that orders for higher
prices will probably not be executed in the near future; they place new orders for
lower prices. However, most traders need more time to acknowledge that their price
claims are probably too high. In result, the best ask price decreases, but the order
book volume in proximity to the new best quote is low. It takes more time until the
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Figure 2. Sketch of the order book shape in the Opinion Game
when a large order is executed. Before the execution, the order
book is in equilibrium (upper left figure); directly afterwards, the
best ask price is increased, and there is more liquidity close to it
(upper right figure). When the LOB recovers from the order, the
best ask price decreases, but the best quotes have a low volume
only (lower figure); it takes more time until the order book is in
equilibrium again.
LOB is back in equilibrium. This recovery behavior of the order book is technically
implemented by the preference for traders close to the best quotes in (3.5) when
we update opinions. As another feature that is known from real world markets,
the best ask price does not return to the value it has had before the execution, but
it stabilizes at higher values after the order book has returned to equilibrium. We
discuss this permanent impact on the best price in Section 4.2.
Since the dynamics are symmetric, the algorithm applies to large sell orders in
the same way.
4. Determining the parameters
The Opinion Game provides a variety of parameters to influence the character-
istics of the modeled market. For instance, it is possible to change the size of the
market or the volatility in the Opinion Game to simulate different markets. Never-
theless, we restrict ourselves in the following to one parameter set, which is stated
in Subsection 4.1. Although the variation of parameters surely leads to additional
insight, our choice already gives a sound understanding of the problems that occur
when applying the AFS model. In the same subsection, we also describe the aver-
aged shape of the Opinion Game’s order book that will serve as shape function f
for the AFS model.
Having set up the Opinion Game, we try to determine the AFS model’s resilience
speed, ρ. It turns out that the assumption of a constant ρ is not valid in the Opinion
Game. Thus, we substitute ρ by a function ρ¯ that maps both the order’s impact and
the time elapsed since the last trade to the resilience speed. We describe how we
can extract the function values from the sampled data, and argue that it is sufficient
to know the impact-dependent function ρ¯(·) := ρ¯(·, τ) only; recall that τ = T/N
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was the recovery time between two successive trades. Finally, we introduce the
generalized AFS theorems that assume the resilience speed to be a function of the
price impact (in Version 2) or the volume impact (in Version 1).
4.1. The parameters of the Opinion Game and the shape of its order
book. There is a high degree of freedom in the parameters for the Opinion Game.
Nevertheless, certain parameter sets have been shown to be more reasonable choices
than others. Calibrated with these parameter values, the Opinion Game results in
a realistic price process in terms of stylized facts. However, not all choices can be
justified rigorously. For an extensive discussion about the choice of parameter γ,
for instance, we refer to [Wei09b]. We used the following values in all simulations
throughout this article, since those ones have been shown to generate price processes
with realistic statistical features [BCˇH06, Wei09a]:
♯ of traders N 2000
♯ of shares M 1000
speed of adaption γ 1.5
jump range {−l, . . . , l} {−4, . . . , 4}
drift of buyers µB e
0.1
drift of sellers µS e
−0.1
jump ranges g¯, g random variables, uniformly distributed on {5, . . . , 20},
sampled idependently every time they are used
All sample runs that we did in the Opinion Game, either to extract necessary pa-
rameters or to test execution strategies, were started independently with a random
seed for the random number generator. Furthermore, the recording of data or the
execution of large orders was started after 1 000 000 simulation steps only, such that
the model had sufficient time to get close to a stable state.
To determine f , we recorded 500 times the Opinion Game’s LOB relative to the
best prices. Figure 3 shows the resulting upper part of the order book. The lower
part is symmetric up to small deviations caused by the object’s random nature.
Even if the shape is not static as assumed in the AFS model, an averaged shape
is clearly visible. We use these mean values to define the shape function f for
the Opinion Game. For non-integer values, we interpolate f by assuming that
the function is a right-continuous step function. This means that we violate the
assumption of the AFS model about f being continuous. Yet, this choice for f has
the advantage that the integral of f from 0 to an integer n is equal to the sum of
the integer function values from 0 to n−1. Furthermore, for all parameter sets that
we considered, we were still able to find unique solutions for the optimal trading
strategies.
Recall that the price scale in the Opinion Game is logarithmic, whereas the AFS
model assumes a linear scale. However, it is possible to scale the grid of the Opinion
Game with a factor ǫ, and the difference between logarithmic and linear scale is
negligible if ǫ is small. To determine the order of ǫ, we consider an order of 200
units of shares, 20% of the market volume in the Opinion Game; it is mentioned
in [AFS09] that the size of large orders can amount up to twenty percent of the
daily traded volume. We assume that the shape of the LOB, f , is determined as
described above, and the best ask price before our trade is denoted by A0. Then
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Figure 3. The seller part of the LOB relative to the best ask price.
The solid line marks the mean values, the dashed lines illustrate
the quartiles. The minimal and maximal values are illustrated by
the dotted lines.
the relative impact costs are given by
(4.1)
1
200eǫA0
∫ D0+
0
eǫ(A
0+x)f(x)dx − 1 ≈
ǫ
200
∫ D0+
0
xf(x)dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
≈2039.47
≈ 10.20ǫ.
An empirical study of the US stock market shows that large orders can cause
relative costs up to 3.55% [ATHL05]. If we assume that ǫ ≤ 0.0355/10.2, then ǫ is
of order 10−3 at most. Thus, it is reasonable to assume ǫ to be small. However, we
are interested in qualitative results; thus, and for the sake of convenince, we will
simply assume that the Opinion Game operates on Z.
4.2. Determining ρ for the AFS model. In the following, we present our ap-
proach to calibrate ρ for the Opinion Game. We describe our simulation approach
and the corresponding results for Version 2 of the AFS model only. Recall that, in
this version, ρ determines the recovery speed of the price impact. Our ansatz and
the observations are qualitatively the same for the other version. Nevertheless, we
introduce the GAFS model for the price impact dependent as well as for the volume
impact dependent case in the end of this section.We first describe how we sampled
the necessary data. Afterwards, we focus on the main problems of extracting ρ from
those data. Possible solutions are discussed and culminate in this section’s main
result: The GAFS theorems, which assume that the resilience speed is a function
ρ¯ depending on the order’s impact.
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We fixed a price impact D ∈ {1, . . . , 20} and ran 2500 simulations for each value
of D, resulting in 50 000 simulations. Since every run had an initialization period
of 1 000 000 steps, each simulation took several seconds. Observe that a simulation
time of one second per run already results in a total computing time of almost
14 hours. As we ran several simulations parallel, we were able to finish the data
collecting within a few days.
Each run consisted of a trading part in which a large sell order was executed at
once. The particular order volume was determined by its price impact: The trading
part was finished as soon as the impact was equal to D. In a second experiment’s
part, we recorded the relaxiation of the price. In particular, the large execution
took place at time t¯ := 1 000 000; we recorded
(4.2) p¯(t) := pa(t+ 1 + t¯)− pa(t¯)
for t ∈ {0, . . . , 50 000}. The process (p¯(t))t∈N0 is the discrete counterpart of the
AFS model’s process DA.
To avoid problems caused by random fluctuations in p¯, we consider the pointwise
average of the samples denoted by 〈p¯〉 and defined by
(4.3) 〈p¯〉t :=
1
2500
2500∑
i=0
p¯it
for all t ∈ {0, . . . , 50 000}, p¯i denoting the ith sample. For a clear distinction, we
denote the value for ρ that we extract from 〈p¯〉 by ρ¯num. The AFS model assumes
〈p¯〉 to be of the form
(4.4) 〈p¯〉t = De
−ρ¯numt
with a static value ρ¯num; this follows from equation (2.3). Thus we should be able
to determine ρ¯num by
(4.5) ρ¯num =
lnD − ln〈p¯〉t
t
for an arbitrary t. However, the right hand side of the equation depends on D and
t; thus, we would like to consider ρ¯num(D, t) as a function.
Given 〈p¯〉, let pˆ : [0,∞)→ R the corresponding regression function of the form
(4.6) pˆt := A+Be
ρˆt,
for t ∈ [0,∞). It is determined by a Newton-Gauß algorithm with three degrees of
freedom: A, B, ρˆ. Observe that all three values can depend on D. The form of
the regression function is motivated by assumption (4.4), which also leads to the
expectation that A = 0 and B = D. Figure 4 shows the statistical behavior of p¯
for D = 8, the corresponding 〈p¯〉 and pˆ. Furthermore, we compare 〈p¯〉 for different
D values. The three main problems are visible:
(1) The AFS model assumes AD to be 0; this is not the case.
(2) The measured data is only well-approximated by an exponential function for
large times. For small t, it is doubtful that the assumption of an exponential
decay is the right choice at all.
(3) If ρ¯num was constant the 〈p¯〉 should be approximately parallel on a loga-
rithmic scale; instead, ρ¯num depends D.
These problems occured for all tested values of D. Next, we discuss the problems
and their consequences for the determination of ρ¯num one by one.
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Figure 4. The two upper graphs show quartiles and extremal val-
ues of 2500 samples of p¯ for D = 8, and the corresponding 〈p¯〉 and
pˆ (red). The graph on top illustrates the long time behavior on the
domain t ∈ [0, 50 000]. Clearly, pˆ converges to a level AD > 0. The
middle graph displays t ∈ [0, 2000] showing the poor approximation
by pˆ. The lower graph shows 〈p¯〉 (black) for D = 16, D = 12 and
D = 8 (top down) as well as their regression functions pˆ (red) on
a logarithmic scale and with respect to the new asymptotic levels
AD. If ρ¯num was constant the 〈p¯〉 should be approximately parallel.
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Figure 5. Mean, quartiles and extremal values of 500 samples
of the permanent impact in dependence on the purchased volume
V ∈ {25, 50, . . . , 275, 300}. For every volume V , we recorded the
best ask price before the trade and the averaged best ask price
500 000 steps after the trade. Here, the averaged best ask price
is the mean of the best ask price sampled all 100 steps over a
time interval of 100 000 steps. The linear regression of the mean is
displayed in red.
4.2.1. Existence of a permanent price impact. The reason for problem (1) is a per-
mament impact on the order book that a large trade causes. After having recovered,
the LOB is shifted by Iper(X), whereby Iper : R → R is assumed to be increasing
and Iper(0) = 0. Huberman and Stanzl [HS04] argued on a theoretic level that
linearity of Iper is equivalent to the absence of arbitrage opportunities. Empirical
studies by Almgren et al. [ATHL05] reinforce the conjecture of a linear perma-
nent impact: The authors state that the permanent impact is well described by
the power law x0.9±0.1 with respect to a Gaussian error model; the assumption of
linearity cannot be rejected by this result. Figure 5 shows the permanent impact
for the Opinion Game. The mean is well aproximated by a linear function with
coefficient 0.02738.
Concerning the problems in determining ρ¯num, caused by the positive AD, we
have two possibilities: First, we could ignore the permanent impact such that ρ¯num
would be given by (4.5). This would be an appropriate solution for small t, but it
would cause the AFS model to assume that even for large t the LOB is still not
close to equilibrium; ρ¯num could become arbitrarily small. Second, we could assume
that the whole model has been shifted by AD such that AD is the new zero line. In
this case, ρ¯num would be given by
(4.7) ρ¯num(D, t) =
lnD − ln(〈p¯〉t −AD)
t
,
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which is fine for large t but grows to infinity as t goes to zero. To avoid this problem,
we define
(4.8) ρ¯num(D, t) :=
lnD − ln(〈p¯〉t − (1− e
−t)AD)
t
.
Furthermore, let us point out that there is no special reason to choose 1− exp(−t).
However, at this point, it becomes clear that the complex dynamics within the LOB
are poorly described by an added permanent impact function.
4.2.2. 〈p¯〉 is poorly approximated by an exponential function. Since 〈p¯〉 should decay
exponentially fast, ρ¯num should be a constant. However, the existence of a perma-
nent impact and the consequential definition of ρ¯num in (4.8) makes the validity of
this assumption unlikely here. Yet, even without the permanent impact, the de-
scription of 〈p¯〉 by an exponential function is poor as the upper right graph of Figure
4 shows. As mentioned in Section 2, the rejection of an exponential decay does not
contradict former research results. If we nevertheless try to calibrate ρ, it becomes
time-dependent. A time-dependent resilience speed seems to be incompatible with
the AFS theorems at first, but a closer look at the theorem’s statement reveals that
ρ is only needed to determine the order book state before the next trade, given the
state after the current trade. The time between two succeeding trades is given by
τ . Thus, we focus on ρ¯num(·, τ) and use the notation
(4.9) ρ¯num(D) := ρ¯num(D, τ)
assuming that τ , which is given by the input parameters N and T , is fixed. Figure
6 shows the function ρ¯num(·, τ) for several values of τ .
4.2.3. ρ¯num is a function of D. In contrast to the time dependence, the dependence
on the order’s price impact requires a generalization of the AFS theorem, stated in
Section 2. Now, the resilience speed ρ¯ : R → (0,∞) is a continously differentiable
function of DA. In particular, the equations (2.3) and (2.14), which describe the
price recovery in the AFS model, change to
(4.10) DAt := e
−ρ¯(DAtn+)(t−tn)D
A
tn+ for t ∈ (tn, tn+1],
(4.11) DBt := e
−ρ¯(DBtn+)(t−tn)D
B
tn+ for t ∈ (tn, tn+1].
We denote this modified model as Version 2 of the generalized AFS model.
For the following theorem concerning the optimal trading strategy for the GAFS
model, we need two technical assumptions:
(4.12) The range of ρ¯ is a subset of [k,K], 0 < k < K <∞, and
(4.13) 1− τ ρ¯′(x)x > 0 for all x ∈ R.
The first assumption bounds the relaxation speed, the second assumption ensures
that a larger impact cannot overtake a smaller one in the recovery phase as we will
see in Lemma A.1.
Theorem 4.1 (Optimal stratey for the generalized AFS model, Version 2). Suppose
that ρ¯ fulfils (4.12) and (4.13), and that f satisfies
(4.14) lim
|x|→∞
x2 inf
y∈[eτρ¯(x)x,x]
f(y) =∞
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Figure 6. We show the graphs of ρnum(D, τ) in dependence on
D for τ = 70, 700, 7000 (top down). Observe that the x-axis only
begin in 5 due to the fact that small price impacts cannot be dis-
tinguished from the noise contained in the signal.
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Furthermore, let the function
(4.15) h2(x) := x
f(x) − e−2τ ρ¯(x)f(e−τ ρ¯(x)x)(1 − τ ρ¯′(x)x)
f(x)− e−τ ρ¯(x)f(e−τ ρ¯(x)x)(1 − τ ρ¯′(x)x)
be one-to-one. Then there exists a unique optimal strategy ξ(2) = (ξ
(2)
0 , . . . , ξ
(2)
N ) ∈
Ξˆ. The initial market order ξ
(2)
0 is the unique solution of the equation
(4.16) F−1
(
X0 −N
[
ξ
(2)
0 − F
(
e−τ ρ¯(F
−1(ξ
(2)
0 ))F−1(ξ
(2)
0 )
)])
= h2(F
−1(ξ
(2)
0 )),
the intermediate orders are given by
(4.17) ξ
(2)
1 = · · · = ξ
(2)
N−1 = ξ
(2)
0 − F
(
e−τ ρ¯(F
−1(ξ
(2)
0 ))F−1(ξ
(2)
0 )
)
,
and the final order is determined by
(4.18) ξ
(2)
N = X0 −
N∑
n=0
ξ(2)n .
In particular, the optimal stratey is deterministic. Moreover, it consists only of
nontrivial buy orders, that is ξ
(2)
n > 0 for all n.
Proof. See Appendix A.2. 
Observe that the intermediate orders of the optimal strategy, defined in (4.17),
have the same size. Furthermore, they suggest to purchase exactly that volume
that has recovered since the last trade. The GAFS model has inherited this feature
from the AFS model. Yet, this observation means that also the DAtn+ are equal
to each other for all n ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}, and thus, ρ¯ is only evaluated for one
value. In other words, although ρ¯ is a function, the optimal strategy uses only one
value. Of course, if ρ¯ ≡ ρ for some constant ρ in the GAFS model both models, the
GAFS and the AFS, coincide. This is the main advantage of the GAFS theorem:
It determines the right resilience speed from ρ¯; a manual calibration, as in the AFS
model, is not needed anymore.
As already mentioned, our simulations for the calibration of ρ in Version 1 of the
AFS model result in the same problems as described for Version 2. Especially, ρ
becomes volume impact dependent, motivating the GAFS model, Version 1: Now,
the resilience speed ρ¯ : [0,∞)→ (0,∞) is a twice differentiable function of EA. In
particular, the equations (2.10) and (2.14) from the AFS model become
(4.19) EAt := e
−ρ¯(EAtn+)(t−tn)EAtn+, t ∈ (tn, tn+1],
(4.20) EBt := e
−ρ¯(EBtn+)(t−tn)EBtn+, t ∈ (tn, tn+1].
in the GAFS model. Then, the following theorem determines the optimal trading
strategy in the set of all admissible strategies Ξˆ:
Theorem 4.2 (Optimal stratey for the generalized AFS model, Version 1). Suppose
that ρ¯ fulfils the assumptions (4.12) and (4.13), and additionally
(4.21) e−ρ¯(x)τ (1− τ ρ¯′(x)x) < 1 for all x ∈ R.
Furthermore, let the function
(4.22) h1(x) :=
F−1(x) − e−ρ¯(x)τ (1− τ ρ¯′(x)x)F−1(e−ρ¯(x)τx)
1− e−ρ¯(x)τ (1− τ ρ¯′(x)x)
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N T ξ
(2)
0 ξ
(2)
1 ξ
(2)
N Predicted Sampled Samp/Pred
40 400 8.95 4.74 6.38 701.47 1867.74 266%
40 4000 6.13 4.81 6.15 500.24 1573.50 315%
40 40 000 5.16 4.86 5.40 392.42 1076.89 274%
50 400 8.29 3.80 5.29 691.94 1853.37 268%
50 4000 5.20 3.88 4.94 462.51 1535.96 332%
50 40 000 4.26 3.90 4.82 349.26 1014.42 290%
80 400 7.55 2.37 5.63 691.65 1832.69 265%
80 4000 3.73 2.44 3.37 387.98 1464.03 377%
80 40 000 2.65 2.46 2.91 231.67 914.17 395%
Table 1. The optimal strategies according to the GAFS model,
Version 2, for X = 200 and several values for N and T .
be one-to-one. Then there exists a unique optimal strategy ξ(1) = (ξ
(1)
0 , . . . , ξ
(1)
N ) ∈
Ξˆ. The initial market order ξ
(1)
0 is the unique solution of the equation
(4.23) F−1
(
X0 −Nξ
(1)
0 (1− e
−ρ¯(ξ
(1)
0 )τ )
)
= h1(ξ
(1)
0 ),
the intermediate orders are given by
(4.24) ξ
(1)
1 = · · · = ξ
(1)
N−1 = ξ
(1)
0 (1− e
−ρ¯(ξ
(1)
0 )τ ),
and the final order is determined by
(4.25) ξ
(1)
N = X0 −
N∑
n=0
ξ(1)n .
In particular, the optimal stratey is deterministic. Moreover, it consists only of
nontrivial buy orders, that is ξn > 0 for all n.
Proof. See Appendix A.1. 
As in Version 2 of the GAFS model, ρ¯ is only evaluated in one value, and if ρ¯ ≡ ρ
the best strategies of the GAFS and the AFS models coincide.
5. Numerical results
Let us turn to the numerical results of this paper. Again, we focus on Version 2
and use the parameter values determined in the last section to calculate the GAFS
optimal strategies and to apply them in the Opinion Game. We show first that
the resulting costs show an expected behavior on a general level, and that the AFS
model with a suboptimal value for ρ suggests a strategy that produces significantly
higher costs than the corresponding GAFS strategy. Afterwards, we compare the
costs sampled in the Opinion Game to the costs predicted by the GAFS model,
and find large differences. We refer to the values for f and ρ¯, ρ¯num, as determined
in the Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
Table 1 shows the GAFS optimal strategies and their costs for different values
of T and N . We consider two kinds of costs. The predicted costs are the impact
costs that are theoretically predicted by the (G)AFS model. Here, we assume that
the market behaves as described in Section 2. The sampled costs are the average
of 500 samples with the given strategy in the Opinion Game. Observe first that
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Strategy ξ
(2)
0 ξ
(2)
1 ξ
(2)
N Predicted Sampled
GAFS 3.73 2.44 3.37 387.98 1464.03
AFS 21.02 0.97 102.26 979.97 1584.12
Table 2. The optimal strategies and their costs for the AFS
model with ρ = ρˆ and the GAFS model with ρ¯ from Section 4.2.
(X,T,N) = (200, 4000, 80).
the predicted and the sampled costs decrease if the trading time or the number of
trading opportunities increase. Of course, this is no special feature of the (G)AFS
strategies; every fixed strategy benefits from a larger τ , which is implied by a
greater T , and additional trading opportunities can be used, but do not have to be
used. Thus, every reasonable strategy can only perform better with larger T or N .
Nevertheless, the costs of the GAFS strategies show a reasonable behavior.
Furthermore, the GAFS strategies perform better than the AFS strategies: Re-
call that the AFS model with the right value for ρ results in the same optimal
strategy as the GAFS model. Moreover, the (G)AFS model assumes an exponen-
tial decay of the price impact (see (4.4)). We have taken this assumption into
account by introducing 〈ρ¯〉’s regression function pˆ in (4.6), which was of the form
(5.1) pˆt := A+Be
−ρˆt.
Table 2 shows the optimal strategies and their costs for (X,T,N) = (200, 4000, 80)
with respect to the AFS model with ρ = ρˆ and the GAFS model with ρ¯ = ρ¯num.
The example shows that a naive guess of a good ρ can lead to much higher costs:
The AFS costs amount 253% of the GAFS costs in prediction, and still 108% in
the samples.
The last two paragraphs have shown that the GAFS strategies are reasonable
and superior to the AFS stratgies. However, returning to Table 1, we see that the
predicted and the sampled costs for the individual parameter sets differ strongly.
The last column shows both kinds of costs in relation to each other. Obviously,
the sampled costs are multiple times higher. This observation is a strong evidence
that the assumptions of the (G)AFS model are insufficient to capture the whole
complexity of the order book dynamics in the Opinion Game. It is doubtful if the
(G)AFS model really suggests optimal trading strategies for this artificial market
environment. With regard to the Opinion Game features concerning the order book
behavior that we have discussed in Section 3, it is highly unlikely that the (G)AFS
strategies minimize the costs in real world markets.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we have tried to apply the AFS model to an artificial market
environment. The elegance of the AFS model, the order book approach and the
explicit results for the optimal trading strategies, cannot be denied. Yet, the prob-
lems we faced in calibrating the model to our market pose the question if the AFS
model assumptions are oversimplified. We point out again that the problems we
had to handle, the permanent impact and the non-exponential decay of the impact,
are not artificial. It is well known that those effects are also characteristic for real
markets. Even if it is possible to bypass some problems or to extend the model in
a suitable way as we did by introducing the GAFS model, the question remains if
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a next generation of large order models is necessary. In [GSS10], the authors call
the large order market models with an underlying order book models of the second
generation dissociation of (first generation) large order models working with fixed
price impact functions as described in the introduction. Here, a third generation
of models is conceivable taking into account that the order book shape is not con-
stant such that there is no one-to-one correspondence between the price and the
volume and that the market adapts to periodically executed large orders. Yet, it is
also obvious those models would be of much higher complexity and analytic results
would be hard to get; a wide subject for future research.
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Appendix A. Proofs of the Theorems 4.1 and 4.2
The structure of the proofs remains the same as in the proofs of the corresponding
AFS theorems (see Appendices A to C in [AFS09]). Nevertheless, we need to justify
the constraints on ρ¯; furthermore, the calculations become more complicated by our
generalization. For simplicity, we assume t0 = 0 in this section.
We start with the introduction of slightly changed dynamics for the GAFS model
and the reduction of the admissible strategies to deterministic ones. For any ad-
missible strategy ξ, the new dynamics is defined by the processes D := (Dt)t≥0 and
E := (Et)t≥0. We set D0 = Dt0 := 0 =: Et0 = E0 and
(A.1) Etn+ := Etn + ξn and Dtn+ := F
−1(F (Etn) + ξn)
for the trading times t0, . . . , tN . The processes’ values between two successive trad-
ing times t ∈ (tn, tn+1) are given by
(A.2)
Et := e
−ρ¯(Etn+)(t−tn)Etn+ for Version 1;
Dt := e
−ρ¯(Dtn+)(t−tn)Dtn+ for Version 2.
Given one process, we can recover the other one by the equations (2.8):
(A.3) Et = F (Dt) and Dt = F
−1(Et).
Lemma A.1. Under assumption (4.13),
(A.4) EBt ≤ Et ≤ E
A
t and D
B
t ≤ Dt ≤ D
A
t
for all t ≥ 0. In the special case that all ξn are non-negative, we have D
A = D and
EA = E.
Proof. To see that DA = D and EA = E if ξ consists of buy orders only, observe
that the new dynamics matches exactly the original ones for such a ξ.
For the general case, we consider EBt ≤ Et; the other inequalities follow equiva-
lently. Observe that it is sufficient to prove
(A.5) EBtn+1 ≤ Etn+1
for
(A.6) EBtn+ ≤ Etn+,
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since both function are exponentially decreasing on (tn, tn+1], and the relative order
of EB and E cannot be reversed from tn to tn+. Furthermore, we can restrict
ourselves to the case that EBtn+ and Etn+ have the same sign, as the signs canno
change in the considered time interval, (tn, tn+1]. We are consequently done if we
can show that the inequality
(A.7) |x+ y|e−ρ¯(x+y)τ > |x|e−ρ¯(x)τ
for all (x, y) ∈ R2 with sgn(x+ y)=sgn(x) and |x+ y| > |x|. Observe that we have
equality in the equation above if we consider the trivial case that y = 0. We define
a function ux : R→ R by
(A.8) ux(y) := (x+ y)e
−ρ¯(x+y)τ .
Differentiation yields
(A.9) u′x(y) = e
−ρ¯(x+y)τ (1− τ ρ¯′(x)x).
The right hand side of this equation is positive by assumption (4.13), thus ux is
strictly increasing. Since ux(0) = xe
−ρ¯(x)τ , (A.7) is proven. 
It remains to define the simplified price of ξn under the new dynamics by
(A.10) π¯tn(ξn) :=
∫ Dtn+
Dtn
(A0tn + x)f(x)dx = A
0
tn
ξn +
∫ Dtn+
Dtn
xf(x)dx.
Observe that
(A.11) π¯tn(ξn) ≤ πtn(ξn)
for all admissible strategies ξ because of Lemma A.1. In particular, if ξ consists of
buy orders only, we have equality.
We show in the next two sections that, the strategies given in the Theorems 4.2
and 4.1, ξ(1) and ξ(2), are the unique minimizers of the price functional
(A.12) C¯ (ξ) := E
[
N∑
n=0
π¯tn(ξn)
]
for the corresponding version of the model. As ξ(1) and ξ(2) consist of buy orders
only, (A.11) and the remark afterwards imply that these strategies are also the
minimizers of the original price functional C .
We turn to the reduction of Ξˆ to deterministic strategies. Let us define the
remaining trading volume X = (Xt)t∈[0,T ] by
(A.13) Xt :=
{
X0 −
∑
tn<t
ξn for t ≤ T
0 for t > T
.
Furthermore, we set XtN+1 := 0. We can transform the price of a strategy ξ ∈ Ξˆ
by
(A.14)
N∑
n=0
π¯tn(ξn) =
N∑
n=0
A0tnξn +
N∑
n=0
∫ Dtn+
Dtn
xf(x)dx,
and use definition (A.13) as well as integration by parts to rewrite the first term on
the right hand side:
(A.15)
N∑
n=0
A0tnξn = −
N∑
n=0
A0tn
(
Xtn+1 −Xtn
)
= X0A0 +
N∑
n=0
Xtn
(
A0tn −A
0
tn+1
)
.
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Since ξ is admissible, X is a bounded process and Xtn is Ftn−1-measurable, A
0 is
a martingale. Thus, the expectation of (A.15) must be X0A0. The second term on
the right hand side of (A.14) is deterministic for a given realization of a strategy
ξ(ω). We denote this term by
(A.16)
C(i)(ξ) : RN+1 → R
ξ 7→
∑N
n=0
∫Dtn+
Dtn
xf(x)dx
for Version i, i ∈ {1, 2}. Now, we can express C¯ by
(A.17) C¯ (ξ) = A0X0 + E(C
(i)(ξ)).
We spend the next two section to show C(i) has a unique minimizer in the set
(A.18) Ξ :=
{
x := (x0, . . . , xN ) ∈ R
N+1 :
N∑
n=0
xn = X0
}
and this minimizer is determined by the formula given in Theorem 4.2 or 4.1 re-
spectively.
For the sake of convenience, we introduce some more notation:
(A.19) a¯x := exp(−τ ρ¯(x)) for x ∈ R,
(A.20) an :=
{
exp(−τ ρ¯(Etn+)) in Section A.1
exp(−τ ρ¯(Dtn+)) in Section A.2
for n ∈ {0, . . . , N}.
Because the range of ρ¯ is assumed to be [k,K], 0 < k < K <∞, by (4.12),
(A.21) e−τK ≤ a¯x ≤ e
−τk and e−τK ≤ an ≤ e
−τk.
Additionally, we will need these functions:
(A.22) F˜ (x) :=
∫ x
0 xf(x)dx and G(x) := F˜ (F
−1(x)).
Observe that
(A.23) G′(x) = F˜ ′(F−1(x))(F−1)′(x) = F−1f(F−1(x))
1
f(F−1(x))
= F−1(x),
and thus, G is twice continuously differentiable, non-negative, convex and has a
fixed point in 0.
A.1. The optimal strategy for Version 1. In this section, we calculate the
unique minimizer of C(1) in Ξ. For any ξ = (x0, . . . , xN ) ∈ Ξ, we have
C(1)(ξ) =
N∑
n=0
∫ Dtn+
Dtn
xf(x)dx(A.24)
=
N∑
n=0
[
F˜ (F−1(Etn+))− F˜ (F
−1(Etn))
]
=
N∑
n=0
[G(Etn + xn)−G(Etn)]
Lemma A.2. The function C(1) has at least one local minimum in Ξ.
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Proof. The statement will follow from
(A.25) C(1)(ξ)→∞ for ||ξ||∞ →∞
because C(1) is continuous. First, we use the properties of G to find a lower bound
for G(x)−G(cx), x ∈ R and c ∈ [0, 1]:
G(x) −G(cx) ≥ G(cx) + (x− cx)G′(cx)−G(cx)(A.26)
= (1− c)|F−1(cx)||x|.
The inequality (A.26) applied to (A.24) leads to a lower bound for C(1):
C(1)(ξ) = G(EtN + xN )−G(Et0 ) +
N−1∑
n=0
[
G(Etn + xn)−G(Etn+1)
]
= G
((
ΠNn=0an
)
x0 + · · ·+ aN−1xN−1 + xN
)
−G(0)
+
N−1∑
n=0
[
G
((
Πn−1m=0am
)
x0 + · · ·+ an1xn−1 + xn
)
(A.27)
−G
(
an
[(
Πn−1m=0am
)
x0 + · · ·+ an1xn−1 + xn
]) ]
≥ G
((
ΠNn=0an
)
x0 + · · ·+ aN−1xN−1 + xN
)
−G(0)
+
N−1∑
n=0
[
(1− an)
∣∣F−1 (an [(Πn−1m=0am)x0 + · · ·+ an1xn−1 + xn])∣∣
∣∣an [(Πn−1m=0am)x0 + · · ·+ an1xn−1 + xn]∣∣ ].
We define a linear mapping T : RN+1 → RN+1 by
(A.28) T (ξ) :=
(
x0, a0x0 + x1, . . . ,
[
ΠN−1n=0 an
]
x0 + · · ·+ aN−1xN−1 + xN
)
,
and the smallest an by
(A.29) a := min{an : n ∈ {0, . . . , N}}.
Observe that
(A.30) ||T (ξ)||∞ ≥ ||(x0, ax0 + x1, . . . , a
nx0 + · · ·+ axN−1 + xN )||∞ →∞
for ||ξ||∞ →∞ as well as G(x)→∞ and |F
−1(ax)||x| → ∞ for |x| → ∞. The last
statement follows, because F is unbounded. Finally, we define
(A.31) H(x) := min
(
G(x), |F−1(ax)||x|
)
.
Also H(x)→∞ for x→∞, and consequently,
(A.32) C(1)(ξ) ≥ H(||T (ξ)||∞)−G(0)→∞.

One has to determine ξ
(1)
0 by solving
(A.33) F−1
(
X0 −Nξ
(1)
0 (1− a0)
)
= h1(ξ
(1)
0 )
in Theorem 4.2. We define the function
(A.34) hˆ1(x) := h1(x)− F
−1 (X0 −N(1− a¯x)x)
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for which ξ
(1)
0 is a zero.
Lemma A.3. Given that the assumptions of Theorem 4.2 hold, function hˆ1 has at
most one zero, which is positive if it exists.
Proof. For the existence of at most one zero, it is sufficient to show that hˆ1 is
strictly increasing. The function h1 has a fixed point in 0, is positive for positive
arguments and continuous as well as bijective, thus it must be strictly increasing
or, equivalently, its slope must be strictly positive. Consequently, the slope of hˆ1 is
also positive, because
hˆ′1(x) = h
′
1(x)−
d
dx
[
F−1 (X0 −Nx(1 − a¯x))
]
(A.35)
= h′1(x) +N
1− a¯x (1− τ ρ¯
′(x)x)
f(F−1(X0 −Nx(1− a¯x)))
,(A.36)
and the numerator of the second term is positive by assumption (4.21). The posi-
tivity of the zero (if existing) follows simply from
(A.37) hˆ1(0) = −F
−1(X0) < 0.

Now, we are prepared to prove Theorem 4.2.
Lemma A.4. Strategy ξ(1) is the unique minimizer of function C(1) and all com-
ponents of ξ(1) are positive.
Proof. We showed in Lemma A.2 that there is an optimal strategy ξ∗ = (x∗0, . . . , x
∗
N ) ∈
Ξ. Thus, there must be a Lagrange multiplier ν ∈ R such that
(A.38)
∂
∂x∗n
C(1)(ξ∗) = ν for n ∈ {0, . . . , N}.
Using representation (A.24) of C(1), one gets
(A.39)
∂
∂xn
C(1)(x) = F−1(Etn+) + an (1− ρ¯
′(Etn+)Etn+)
[
∂
∂xn+1
C(1)(x)− F−1(Etn+1)
]
for n ∈ {0, . . . , N−1}. In combination with the Langrange multiplier, the recursive
formula yields
(A.40) F−1(Etn+) + an (1− ρ¯
′(Etn+)Etn+)
[
ν − F−1(Etn+1)
]
= ν
(A.41) ⇔ ν =
F−1(Etn+)− an (1− ρ¯
′(Etn+)Etn+)F
−1(anEtn+)
1− an (1− ρ¯′(Etn+)Etn+)
= h1(Etn+)
for n ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}. The function h1 is bijective by assumption, and thus,
x∗0 = h
−1
1 (ν)(A.42)
x∗n = (1 − a0)x
∗
0 for n ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1}(A.43)
x∗N = X0 − x
∗
0 − (N − 1)x
∗
0(1− a0).(A.44)
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Therefore, the optimal strategy ξ∗ is completely defined if we can determine x∗0.
By (A.24),
C(1)(x∗) = G(x∗0)−G(0) + (N − 1) [G(a0x
∗
0 + (1− a0)x
∗
0)−G(a0x
∗
0)]
+G(a0x
∗
0 +X0 − x
∗
0 − (N − 1)(1− a0)x
∗
0)−G(a0x
∗
0)
= N [G(x∗0)−G(a0x
∗
0)] +G(X0 −N(1− a0)x
∗
0)−G(0)(A.45)
=: C
(1)
0 (x
∗
0).
We know that C
(1)
0 has a minimum because of Lemma A.2. We can find it by
differentiation:
d
dx
C
(1)
0 (x)(A.46)
= N
[
F−1(x) − a¯x[1− τ ρ¯
′(x)x]F−1(a¯xx)
− (1− a¯x[1− τ ρ¯
′(x)x])F−1(X0 −N(1− a¯x)x)
]
= N (1− a¯x[1− τ ρ¯
′(x)x]) hˆ1(x).
Assumption (4.21) and Lemma A.3 tell us C(1) has exactly one minimum, and this
minimum is positive. We have established the uniqueness and representation of the
optimal strategy.
It remains to show that all components of x∗ are positive. We already know that
x∗0 > 0. The positivity of x
∗
n follows from (A.43) for all n ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1}. For
the last order, x∗N , observe that (A.46) vanishes in x
∗
0. Furthermore, F
−1 is strictly
increasing, and thus,
0 = F−1(x∗0)− a0(1− τ ρ¯
′(x∗0)x
∗
0)F
−1(a0x
∗
0)
− [1− a0(1− τ ρ¯
′(x∗0)x
∗
0)]F
−1(X0 −N(1− a0)x
∗
0︸ ︷︷ ︸
=x∗N+a0x
∗
0
)(A.47)
> [1− a0(1 − τ ρ¯
′(x∗0)x
∗
0)]
[
F−1(a0x
∗
0)− F
−1(a0x
∗
0 + x
∗
N )
]
,(A.48)
which, indeed, implies the positivity of x∗N . 
A.2. The optimal strategy for Version 2. In this section, we determine the
unique minimizer of C(2) in Ξ. For ξ = (x0, . . . , xN ) ∈ Ξ, we have
C(2)(ξ) =
N∑
n=0
∫ Dtn+
Dtn
xf(x)dx(A.49)
=
N∑
n=0
(
G(xn + F (Dtn))− F˜ (Dtn)
)
Lemma A.5. The function C(2) has a local minimum in Ξ.
Proof. Again, it suffices to show
(A.50) C(2)(ξ)→∞ for ||ξ||∞ →∞.
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We rearrange (A.49) and get
C(2)(ξ)(A.51)
=
N∑
n=0
(
F˜ (F−1(xn + F (Dtn)))− F˜ (Dtn)
)
= F˜ (aNF
−1(xN + F (DtN )))
+
N∑
n=0
(
F˜ (F−1(xn + F (Dtn)))− F˜ (anF
−1(xn + F (Dtn)))
)
≥
N∑
n=0
(
F˜ (F−1(xn + F (Dtn)))− F˜ (anF
−1(xn + F (Dtn)))
)
A lower bound for the last line of (A.51) is given by
F˜ (x) − F˜ (a¯xx) =
∣∣∣∣
∫ x
a¯xx
zf(z)dz
∣∣∣∣(A.52)
≥ inf
y∈[a¯xx,x]
f(y)
∣∣∣∣
∫ x
a¯xx
zdz
∣∣∣∣
=
1
2
(1 − a¯2x)x
2 inf
y∈[a¯xx,x]
f(y) ≥ 0.
Because of the assumptions (4.14) and (2.17), we know
(A.53) H(x) :=
1
2
(1− a¯2F−1(x))(F
−1(x))2 inf
y∈[a¯
F−1(x)F
−1(x),F−1(x)]
f(y).
tends to infinity for |x| → ∞. Finally, we introduce the mapping
(A.54) T (x) := (x0, x1 + F (Dt1), . . . , xN + F (DtN )),
for which C(2)(x) ≥ H(||T (x)||∞) holds. It remains to show that ||T (x)||∞ → ∞
for |x| → ∞. Let us assume there is a sequence xk such that ||xk||∞ → ∞ but
||T (xk)||∞ remains bounded. This implies especially the boundedness of (x
k
0). But
then again, Dkt1 = a
k
0F
−1(xk0) remains bounded. We can continue the argumen-
tation for all coordinates of T (x) and conclude that (xkn) is a bounded sequence
for all n ∈ {0, . . . , N}. This contradicts the assumption, and thus the lemma is
proven. 
Lemma A.6. Under the assumptions of Theorem 4.1, equation (4.16) has at most
one solution, which is positive if existing. Furthermore, g(x) := f(x)−a¯xf(a¯xx)(1−
τ ρ¯′(x)x) is positive.
Proof. We show that both h2 ◦ F
−1 and
(A.55) hˆ2(x) := −F
−1
(
X0 −N
[
x− F
(
a¯F−1(x)F
−1(x)
)])
are strictly increasing. In this case, at most one zero can exist, and its positivity
is guaranteed by h2(F
−1(0)) = 0 and hˆ2(0) = −F (X0) < 0. The function h2 is
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strictly increasing because it is continuous, bijective, has a fixed point at zero and
lim
ǫ→0
h2(ǫ)− h2(0)
ǫ
= lim
ǫ→0
f(ǫ)− a¯2ǫf(a¯ǫǫ)(1 − τ ρ¯
′(ǫ)ǫ)
f(ǫ)− a¯ǫf(a¯ǫǫ)(1− τ ρ¯′(ǫ)ǫ)
(A.56)
=
1− a¯20
1− a¯0
> 0.(A.57)
Since F−1 is also strictly increasing, we have proven the same property for h2◦F
−1.
We differentiate hˆ2:
(A.58)
hˆ′2(x) = N
[
f(F−1(x))− a¯F−1(x)f(a¯F−1(x)F
−1(x))(1 − τ ρ¯′(F−1(x))F−1(x))
f(F−1(x))f
(
F−1
(
X0 −N
[
x− F (a¯F−1(x)F−1(x))
]))
]
This expression is strictly positive because the numerator is strictly positive as we
show next. We define both
(A.59)
k(x) := f(x)− a¯xf(a¯xx)(1 − τ ρ¯
′(x)x) and
k2(x) := f(x)− a¯
2
xf(a¯xx)(1 − τ ρ¯
′(x)x).
The numerater of (A.58) can be expressed by k(F−1(x)), and furthermore, h2(x) =
xk2(x)/k(x). Both functions k and k2 are continuous, and due to the properties of
h explained in the beginning of the proof, the functions must have the same sign
for all x ∈ R. The function k2 is greater than k for all x ∈ R; thus, there can be
no change of signs and we have either k(x) > 0 and k2(x) > 0 or k(x) < 0 and
k2(x) < 0 for all x. Because k(0) = f(0)(1− a¯0) > 0, positivity is proven. 
Lemma A.7. For all n ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}, the partial derivatives of C(1) can be
expressed by
∂
∂xn
C(2)(x) = Dtn+ +
anf(Dtn+1)(1− τ ρ¯
′(Dtn+)Dtn+)
f(Dtn+)
[
∂
∂xn+1
C(2)(x) −Dtn+1
]
.
Proof. First, observe
(A.60)
∂
∂xn
Dtm =
anf(Dtn+1)
f(Dtn+)
(1− τ ρ¯′(Dtn+)Dtn+)
∂
∂xn+1
Dtm
for n ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 2}. This follows from
∂
∂xn
Dtm (A.61)
=
∂
∂xn
[
am−1F
−1(xm−1 + F (. . . (anF
−1(xn + F (Dtn))) . . . ))
]
=
[
m−1∏
k=n+1
[
d
dx
a¯F−1(xk+F (x))F
−1(xk + F (x))
]
x=Dtk
][
∂
∂xn
a¯F−1(xn+F (Dtn ))F
−1(xn + F (Dtn))
]
=
[
f(Dtn+1)
∂
∂xn+1
Dtm
] [
an (1− τ ρ¯
′(Dtn+)Dtn+)
f(Dtn+)
]
.
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We use (A.60) and (A.49) for the transformation
∂
∂xn
C(2)(x)(A.62)
= F−1(xn + F (Dtn)) +
N∑
m=n+1
∂
∂xn
[
G(xm + F (Dtm))− F˜ (Dtm)
]
= Dtn+ +
N∑
m=n+1
f(Dtm)
[
∂
∂xn
Dtm
] [
F−1(xm + F (Dtm))−Dtm
]
= Dtn+ +
anf(Dtn+1)
f(Dtn+)
[1− τ ρ¯′(Dtn+)Dtn+]
(
Dtn+1+ −Dtn+1
+
N∑
m=n+2
f(Dtm)
[
∂
∂xn+1
Dtm
] [
F−1(xm + F (Dtm))−Dtm
] )
.
Now, the same calculation for ∂C(2)(x)/∂xn+1 results in
(A.63)
∂
∂xn
Dtm = Dtn+1+ +
N∑
m=n+2
f(Dtm)
[
∂
∂xn+1
Dtm
] [
F−1(xm + F (Dtm))−Dtm
]
,
and combining (A.62) and (A.63) yields the desired result. 
Finally, we are prepared to prove Theorem 4.1.
Lemma A.8. Strategy ξ(2) is the unique minimizer of function C(2) and all com-
ponents of ξ(2) are positive.
Proof. Lemma A.5 guarantees the existence of at least one optimal strategy ξ∗ ∈ Ξ.
By standard arguments, there is a Lagrange multiplier ν ∈ R such that
(A.64)
∂
∂x∗n
C(2)(ξ∗) = ν for n ∈ {0, . . . , N}.
We use Lemma A.7 to get
(A.65) ν = Dtn+ +
anf(anDtn+)
f(Dtn+)
(1− τ ρ¯′(Dtn+)Dtn+) [ν − anDtn+]
(A.66) ⇔ ν = Dtn+
f(Dtn+)− a
2
nf(anDtn+)(1 − τ ρ¯
′(Dtn+)Dtn+)
f(Dtn+)− anf(anDtn+)(1 − τ ρ¯
′(Dtn+)Dtn+)
= h2(Dtn+)
for n ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}. Function h2 is one-to-one, and thus,
(A.67) ν = h2(F
−1(x∗n + F (Dtn)))
implies that x∗n + F (Dtn) does not depend on n ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}. Consequently,
Dtn+ = F
−1(x∗n + F (Dtn)) is constant in n such that we can conclude
x∗0 = F (h
−1
2 (ν)),(A.68)
x∗n = x
∗
0 − F (Dtn) = x
∗
0 − F (a0F
−1(x∗0)) for n ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1},(A.69)
x∗N = X0 − x
∗
0 − (N − 1)
[
x∗0 − F (a0F
−1(x∗0))
]
.(A.70)
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The value x∗0 determines the optimal solution completely, and thus, it must mini-
mize
C
(2)
0 (x0)
:= C(2)
(
x0, x0 − F
(
a0F
−1(x0)
)
, . . . , X0 − x0 − (N − 1)
[
x0 − F (a0F
−1(x0))
])
(A.49)
= G(x0) +
N−1∑
n=1
[
G(x0)− F˜ (a0F
−1(x0))
]
+G(X0 −N [x0 − F (a0F
−1(x0))]) − F˜ (a0F
−1(x0))
= N [G(x0)− F˜ (a0F
−1(x0))] +G(X0 −N [x0 − F (a0F
−1(x0))]).
Differentiation results in
dC
(2)
0 (x0)
dx0
= N
[
D0+ − a
2
0D0+
f(Dt1)
f(D0+)
(1− τ ρ¯′(D0+)D0+)(A.71)
+Dtn+
(
a0
f(Dt1)
f(D0+)
(1− τ ρ¯′(D0+)D0+)− 1
)]
such that we can calculate the minimizer by
(A.72)
d
dx∗0
C
(2)
0 (x
∗
0) = 0
⇔ DtN+ = D0+
f(D0+)−a
2
0f(Dt1 )(1−τ ρ¯
′(D0+)D0+)
f(D0+)−a0f(Dt1 )(1−τ ρ¯
′(D0+)D0+)
.
The left hand side of the last line can be rewritten as
DtN+ = F
−1(F (DtN ) + x
∗
N )(A.73)
= F−1(F (Dt1) +X0 − x
∗
0 − (N − 1)(x
∗
0 − F (Dt1)))
= F−1(X0 −N(x
∗
0 − F (Dt1))
and the right hand side is just h2(F
−1(x∗0)). We know by Lemma A.6 that equation
(A.72) has at most one zero such that we are finished with the existence, uniqueness
and representation of the optimal strategy.
At last, we show that all components of this strategy are positive. We already
know x∗0 > 0 and thus also x
∗
n > 0 for all n ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1} by (A.69). For the
positivity of x∗N , we transform (A.72) into
(A.74)
DtN+ = D0+
[
1 +
a0f(a0D0+)− a
2
0f(a0D0+)
f(D0+)− a0f(a0Dt0+)(1− τ ρ¯
′(D0+)D0+)
(1− τ ρ¯′(D0+)D0+)
]
.
The fraction on the right hand side is strictly positive by Lemma A.6; positivity of
x∗N follows from
(A.75) DtN+ > D0+ =
DtN
a0
> DtN .

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